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Abstract
This paper provides first of all the introduction to this special
issue on ‘Legal constraints on the indeterminate control of
“dangerous” sex offenders in the community: A European
comparative and human rights perspective’. The issue is the
outcome of a study that aims at finding the way legal con-
trol can not only be an instrument but also be a controller of
social control. It is explained what social control is and how
the concept of moral panic plays a part in the fact that sex
offenders seem to be the folk devils of our time and subse-
quently pre-eminently the target group of social control at
its strongest. Further elaboration of the methodology
reveals why focussing on post-sentence (indeterminate)
supervision is relevant, as there are hardly any legal con-
straints in place in comparison with measures of preventive
detention. Therefore, a comparative approach within Europe
is taken on the basis of country reports from England and
Wales, France, Germany, The Netherlands and Spain. In the
second part of the paper, the comparative analysis is pre-
sented. Similar shifts in attitudes towards sex offenders have
led to legislation concerning frameworks of supervision in all
countries but in different ways. Legal constraints on these
frameworks are searched for in legal (sentencing) theory,
the principles of proportionality and least intrusive means,
and human rights, mainly as provided in the European Con-
vention on Human Rights to which all the studied countries
are subject. Finally, it is discussed what legal constraints on
the control of sex offenders in the community are (to be) in
place in European jurisdictions, based on the analysis of
commonalities and differences found in the comparison.
Keywords: social control, folk devils, moral panic, danger-
ousness, sex offenders
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1 Introduction: Background,
Relevance and Approach
1.1 Law as an Instrument and Controller of
Social Control
In 1985, then already an influential author in sociology
and criminology, Stanley Cohen published his book
‘Visions of social control’. In regard to the term social
control, he discerns that it appears in the literature as a
neutral term to cover all social processes to induce con-
formity ranging from infant socialization through to
public execution, as well as a negative term to cover
both the obvious and putative hidden element in all
state-sponsored social policy, whether called health,
education or welfare. For his own purpose of showing
shifts in programmed social control, he then narrows the
term to
the organized ways in which society responds to
behavior and people it regards as deviant, problemat-
ic, worrying, threatening, troublesome or undesirable
in some way or another. This response appears under
many terms: punishment, deterrence, treatment, pre-
vention, segregation, justice, rehabilitation, reform or
social defence.1
Many, if not all, of these responses are established
through law, making law the most prominent instru-
ment of social control as he defines it.
Regarding the current developments in criminal law,
Cohen’s visions seem to be truly visionary. Among the
shifts he observed in 1985 is a generally enlarging and
more intrusive system, ‘subjecting more and newer
groups of deviants to the power of the state and increas-
ing the intensity of control directed at former deviants’.2
This development is echoed in the chain of writings
since then on the criminal justice implications of the
identified ‘risk society’,3 ‘culture of fear’4 and the sup-
1. S. Cohen, Visions of Social Control (1985), at 1.
2. Ibid., 38.
3. E.g. U. Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (1992).
4. E.g. F. Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk Taking and the Morality of Low
Expectation (1997).
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plementary ‘risk paradigm’.5 The international literature
on how fear and risk are ‘managed’ through criminal
justice emphasizes similarly that the subsequent array of
legislative and policy-making initiatives in the Western
world is targeted at certain groups of criminal offenders.
These groups seem to be singled out for legal control as
‘dangerous’ because of the way in which they are per-
ceived as ‘different’ to the social norm. And as fear-
based policies tend to view ‘justice’ as synonymous with
discipline, these groups are being viewed as ‘beyond
principles of due process’.6
This notion is itself deviant from a general view in legal
theory that especially criminal law is not only an instru-
ment of the exertion of State power, for example, to
ensure safety for the general public, but also a balancing
mechanism to keep that exertion in check and protect
(the rights of) the individual. As law was already identi-
fied as the instrument of social control par excellence,
the question that arises and that is addressed in this
research is what remains of law as a controller of that
control in the current advanced stage of Cohen’s enlarg-
ing system.
1.2 Focus on Sex Offenders as the Folk Devils of
Our Current Moral Panic
Among the usual suspects that appear in literature as the
mentioned targeted groups are terrorists, immigrants,
mentally disordered and sex offenders. Particularly in
regard to that last group, the term social control is cur-
rently fashionable again.7 And this observation applies
similarly to the association between sex offenders and
two other phrasings, not introduced but coined in
another classic work by Stanley Cohen from 1972, ‘Folk
Devils and Moral panics’. While Cohen used these
terms for describing the social reaction to the groups of
Mods and Rockers, two at the time conflicting British
youth subcultures, they are now being used, for exam-
ple, to understand the dynamics surrounding re-entry
of sex offenders in the community after release from
custody.8
Sex offenders seem to have become today’s ‘folk devils’,
a term used by Cohen to describe the mechanism of why
a certain group of people is portrayed in folklore or
media as deviant and to blame for crimes and other
social problems.9 Jenkins identified in the United States
a number of persisting allegations regarding the threat
posed by sex offenders that were accepted as facts by the
population even though they contained only ‘fragments
of truth’:
5. Meaning the avoidance of risk in many areas of personal and social life,
for example, presented in a series named ‘beyond the risk paradigm’ on
different aspects of society. E.g. C. Trotter, G. McIvor & F. McNeill
(eds.), Beyond the Risk Paradigm in Criminal Justice (2016).
6. D. Denney, ‘Fear, Human Rights and New Labour Policy Post-9/11’, 42
Social Policy and Administration 560 (2008).
7. E.g. D.R. Laws, Social Control of Sex Offenders (2016); D. Rickard, Sex
Offenders, Stigma, and Social Control (2016).
8. M. Boone and H. Van de Bunt, ‘Dynamics between Denial and Moral
Panic: The Identification of Convicted Sex Offenders in the Communi-
ty’, 63 Probation Journal 23 (2016).
9. S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and
Rockers (1972).
– Children face a terrible danger of being sexually
abused.
– Sexual abuse is a problem of wide dimensions.
– Sex offenders are compulsive and offend frequently.
– Sex offenders cannot be cured or rehabilitated.
– Sexually deviant behaviour can escalate to murder.
– Sex with adults causes lasting harm to victims.
– Sexual abuse can produce the so-called cycle of abuse
such that abused children will later perpetrate the
same act against new victims.10
These allegations show that the shift from the possible
threat of sex offenders to moral outrage is usually made
through emphasizing the subgroup convicted for a sex
offence against children, often unjustly equated with the
group of paedophiles.11 Explaining the shift in status
from threat to moral outrage is also mainly attempted in
regard to this subgroup. In ‘The moral crusade against
paedophilia’, sociologist Frank Furedi argues that ‘the
paedophile personifies evil in 21st-century society; the
child predator possesses the stand-alone status of the
embodiment of malevolence’.12 He describes how what
first emerged as a moral panic in the 1980s mutated into
a coherent and enduring ideology of evil. The overreac-
tion, also in the media, leads to the idea of an omnipre-
sent threat of this behaviour, which is in fact quite rare.
The ‘normalisation’ of an existential threat haunting
childhood and ‘the natural order of things’ leads to sus-
picion concerning intergenerational relations and even
no-touch and no-picture rules in nurseries and schools.
It also creates zealous moral entrepreneurs or crusaders
as it provides opportunities for moral positioning
against the one evil that all of us can agree on – the stra-
tegic position of a last-standing uncontested moral code.
Furedi believes this to be connected to the sacralisation
of the child as moral opposite of the evil paedophile. In a
world of existential disorientation, the child serves as
the main focus for both emotional and moral invest-
ment.13 Some believe that a sublimated form of guilt
accounts for this dynamic. For example, David Garland,
another sociologist who has worked on criminal justice,
wrote that ‘the intensity of current fear and loathing of
child abusers seems to be connected to unconscious
guilt about negligent parenting and widespread ambiva-
lence about the sexualisation of modern culture’.14 Since
using children as a moral shield is now widely practiced
by policy makers and fear entrepreneurs, this is too
often taken literally in the front row of a mob in front of
a courthouse or an identified paedophile home. Psychia-
trist and publicist Theodore Dalrymple suggests that
exposing children to such scenes is itself abusive, claim-
ing that most of the adults taking their children to such
10. P. Jenkins, Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child Molester in
Modern America (1998), at 1-4.
11. For a more detailed description of the dynamics of moral panic with
regard to sex offenders, see Laws, above n. 7.
12. F. Furedi, ‘The Moral Crusade against Paedophilia’, in V.E. Cree, G.
Clapton & M. Smith, Revisiting Moral Panics (2016).
13. F. Furedi, Paranoid Parenting (2008).
14. D. Garland, ‘The Concept of a Moral Panic’, 4 Crime Media Culture 9
(2008), 17.
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mobs live in the very circumstances that are most likely
to give rise to the, also sexual, abuse of children; there-
fore, such actions are related to a feeling of guilt.15 Iron-
ically, paedophilia itself may be a condition associated
with poor childhood conditions.16
Furedi and Garland agree that in its quality of uniting
all sections of society panic over child abuse is a differ-
ent or indeed a genuine moral panic, not one of periodic
outburst but a permanent regime of vigilance, compara-
ble with that of the Medieval witch-hunt. Furedi con-
cludes that as throughout history, the security of chil-
dren has relied on adults’ assuming responsibility for
their welfare, and the mistrust that now envelops inter-
generational relations threatens to discourage male
adults from assuming this responsibility: ‘Arguably, the
disengagement of many adults from the world of chil-
dren represents a far greater danger than the threat
posed by a (thankfully) tiny group of predators.’17
That those convicted of a sex offence against children
serve as the scapegoat also for other groups targeted by
social control is, for example, demonstrated by the
widespread need for authorities to protect them from
other inmates in (remand) prison.18 As the unique moral
status of the sacred child is a narrative beyond discus-
sion, ‘any opinion can be justified by simply referring to
children, and without having to explain why and how
children justify it’.19 It explains why Furedi observes
that campaigners who are usually vigilant about
encroachment on civil liberties when it comes to new
anti-terrorism laws have appeared indifferent to the vet-
ting of millions of adults under different schemes
designed to police those who work with or come into
contact with children.20 Since through these dynamics,
of all the targeted groups, sex offenders seem to be least
protected against the advancements of social control,
they are rendered to be the most interesting focus of this
search for the last legal constraints standing. Cohen
already argued that on the level of the administration
mass ‘moral panic’, which the pursuit of folk devils can
evoke, influences legislation and policy-making.21
In addition, there are other arguments for this limitation
in scope. As the deviance of sex offenders is often envel-
oped in the medical model,22 similarly to the group of
mentally disordered, the interlinking of such discipline
with the notion of ‘risk’ as used in assessments, primari-
ly by mental health practitioners, particularly leads to
15. T. Dalrymple, Spoilt Rotten. The Toxic Cult of Sentimentality (2010).
16. Not just through what is called the cycle of abuse, but also through a
sign of lack of (also physical) growth. Physical height is a manifestation
of in utero and childhood conditions, and pedophilic individuals have
generally been reported to be of lesser height. I.V. McPhail and J.M.
Cantor, ‘Pedophilia, Height, and the Magnitude of the Association:
A Research Note’, 36 Deviant Behavior 288 (2015).
17. Furedi (2016), above n. 12, at 209.
18. E.g. Dalrymple, above n. 15.
19. A. Meyer, The Child at Risk: Paedophiles, Media Responses and Public
Opinion (2007), at 60.
20. Furedi (2016), above n. 12, at 207.
21. Cohen (1972), above n. 9.
22. Compare Laws, above n. 7, chapter 4.
serious ethical and human rights implications.23 More-
over, different, for example, from the group of terrorists
that is targeted before becoming first offenders, the
nature of the (potential) harm by sex offenders is such
that measures of control are often concentrated post-
sentence to avoid re-offending. As these are usually
measures of a preventive nature – as the served sentence
has already addressed retributive demands – and subse-
quently often of indeterminate duration, both of these
characteristics invoke particular legal theoretical discus-
sions.
1.3 Focus on Post-Sentence Control in the
Community through Supervision
Just as sentences aiming at the right to liberty can be
carried out through custody or within the community,
preventive post-sentence measures can be divided in
broad terms into control through custody and control in
the community. In instrumental criminal justice termi-
nology, they can be divided into schemes of preventive
detention and of supervision, and from the civil rights
side, the division can occur as deprivation of liberty and
restriction of liberty. Much of the current international
critical scholarly discussion focuses on preventive
detention.24
First of all, this is to be understood in consideration of
its presumed more invasive character. But perhaps
Stanley Cohen begs to differ. Probably the most promi-
nent shift in social control he observed already in 1985
was that from incarceration to community control. He
found these alternative methods ‘not necessarily more
humane and, indeed, they might be less humane by dis-
guising coercion, increasing invisible discretion or (for
the mentally ill) simply dumping deviants to be neglec-
ted or exploited’.25 He discerns that decarceration was a
seemingly benign initiative in service of diminishing the
discretion of institutions and a search for rehabilitation,
while in fact it was mainly a response to fiscal pressures
and a retrenchment of welfare policies. Recently, the
empirical evidence to support part of this claim was
delivered in the finding that, at least in Europe, com-
munity sanctions have not truly served as an alternative
for imprisonment, but rather as a supplementary sanc-
tion.26 A comparable dynamic is believed to be true for
the more recent alternative of electronic monitoring.27
This is part of the explanation for the current prison
overcrowding, according to the Council of Europe.28 As
23. B. McSherry, Managing Fear: The Law and Ethics of Preventive Deten-
tion and Risk Assessment (2014).
24. E.g. P. Keyzer (ed.), Preventive Detention: Asking the Fundamental
Questions (2013); M. Caianello and M.L. Corrado, Preventing Danger:
New Paradigms in Criminal Justice (2013).
25. Cohen (1985), above n. 1, at 38.
26. M.F. Aebi, N. Delgrande & Y. Marguet, ‘Have Community Sanctions
and Measures Widened the Net of the European Criminal Justice Sys-
tems?’, 17 Punishment & Society 575 (2015).
27. See the recent special issue on electronic monitoring: M. Nellis and M.
Martinovic, ‘Editorial’, 34 Journal of Technology in Human Services 1
(2016); and A. Hucklesby, K. Beyens, M. Boone, F. Dünkel, G. McIvor
& H. Graham, Creativity and Effectiveness in the Use of Electronic
Monitoring: A Case Study of Five Jurisdictions, EMEU-Report (2016).
28. Council of Europe, White Paper on Prison Overcrowding (2016).
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schemes of supervision may be marketed with a similar
rationale of being an alternative for preventive deten-
tion, similar scepticism is warranted.
But probably a more important reason why critical dis-
cussion has focussed on detention instead of supervision
is that the ‘tools’ for discussion from both a theoretical
and human rights perspective are more readily at hand,
while discussing supervision requires exploring more of
a grey area.
In sentencing theory, discussions on preventive schemes
focus first on the debate on the sentencing goals of pun-
ishment versus prevention and the relation with the
(severity of the) original offense. An exemplary finding
from the Canadian Supreme Court was that a ten-year
term of community supervision appended to the end of
a sentence under a ‘long-term offender’ statute could be
validated on the grounds that the supervision was not
punishment.29 A second line along which, from a theo-
retical perspective, the issue may be approached is
through the principles of proportionality and least
intrusive means. As supervision is predominantly con-
sidered to be a less severe sanction, it raises very little
discussion in comparison with the vast literature on pre-
ventive detention.
From an international human rights perspective, espe-
cially the right to liberty and the subsequent prohibition
of arbitrary deprivation of liberty, laid down in many
relevant conventions,30 is the focus of discussion. Again
exemplary is that in her thorough, thirty-plus-page
analysis of the international human rights framework on
preventive schemes, McSherry can only devote two sen-
tences to restriction of liberty:
Supervision orders in relation to offenders also raise
concerns about the violation of the right to liberty,
but have not been subject to the same level of scruti-
ny at the international level as preventive detention
regimes. Presumably, these orders can be justified if
there are sufficient procedural safeguards attached to
them.31
Therefore, this research is aimed at trotting on this
unexplored terrain to find where the borders of social
control in the community are drawn, if any are in fact
drawn. For example, which of the presumed procedural
safeguards that McSherry mentions actually need to be
in place? In keeping with Cohen’s increased intensity of
control directed at ‘former deviants’, this research focu-
ses on post-sentence or post-custody supervision
schemes, although pre-crime or other post-crime (also
pre-trial) schemes may be addressed indirectly.
29. R v. LM, 2 SCR 163 (2008).
30. Art. 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Art. 9 of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; Art. 14 of the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; Article 5 of the European
Convention on Human Rights; Art. 7 of the American Convention on
Human Rights; Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms; the 14th amendment to the United States Constitution; Section
22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
31. McSherry, above n. 23, at 185.
Of course, supervision is not the only legal framework
for post-sentence social control of sex offenders, as, for
example, free-standing restriction orders and registra-
tion and community notification are other possibilities.
Since comparative research showed that the severe
schemes of registration, notification and restriction
orders, virtually limiting the possibilities to live to des-
ignated compounds or literally somewhere under a
bridge, are especially American phenomena unmatched
in other jurisdictions,32 free-standing orders of this kind
are not focused on. However, supervision orders gener-
ally come with conditions of many different kinds,
including restrictions such as location bans, possibly
enforced through electronic monitoring, or other meas-
ures of control that could also be imposed independent-
ly or through other legal frameworks, such as a treat-
ment order. Another increasingly common example of
such a condition is the obligation to undergo DNA-col-
lection, which has human rights implications of its own.
Falling outside the scope of this study are so-called col-
lateral consequences of the conviction of a sex, or even
any other, offence. These are the additional civil or
administrative actions, which are triggered by the con-
viction – although some of these may be part of the con-
viction. They could include loss or restriction of a pro-
fessional license, ineligibility for public funds including
welfare benefits and student loans, loss of voting rights,
loss of residential status for immigrants, etcetera. They
could also be indirectly triggered by the impossibility of
receiving a certificate of good conduct, necessary for
many of the above-mentioned rights or privileges. In the
United States, these collateral consequences can be so
severe that they have been compared to the historical
concept of ‘civil death’.33
Next to the legally organized consequences are, of
course, the societal consequences of the stigma of being
a sex offender, which will form a more hidden barrier
for many necessary requirements for true reintegration,
such as finding a job. Since social life involves present-
ing to others information pertaining to self, individuals
perceived as deviant experience particular problems in
the demanded ‘impression management’ because the
stigma can discredit their social identity.34 Even though
falling outside Cohen’s definition, the stigma and its
consequences can easily be labelled an instrument in the
wider definition of social control. Coping with the stig-
ma itself may even be part of the explanation for the fact
that sex offenders demonstrate heightened levels of neg-
ative emotions, traumatic experiences, mental health
issues, and emotion disregulation, with its subsequent
treatment needs.35
32. See Laws, above n. 7.
33. G.J. Chin, ‘The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of
Mass Conviction’, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1789
(2012).
34. Laws, above n. 7, at 15 shows examples of that and refers to E. Goff-
man, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963).
35. J. Willemsen, V. Seys, E. Gunst & M. Desmet, ‘“Simply Speaking Your
Mind, from the Depths of Your Soul”: Therapeutic Factors in Experien-
tial Group Psychotherapy for Sex Offenders’, 16 Journal of Forensic
Psychology Practice 151 (2016).
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1.4 Focus on Comparing Jurisdictions in Europe
As it is argued that there is no firm framework of inter-
national human rights law with regard to supervision,
while theoretical notions underlying criminal law are
generally at the disposal of (federal, national or regional)
legislators or courts to be picked at their convenience,
this research seems to require a bottom-up approach
and the exploration of sentencing theory, legislation and
practice within individual jurisdictions. Obviously, a
comparative approach is needed in order to find gener-
alities and draw conclusions above the national level.
To have at least some guidance from an international
law perspective, for the purpose of this research, juris-
dictions from within Europe were chosen. Article 5 of
the European Convention on Human Rights is consid-
ered a well-elaborated provision on the right to liberty.36
First of all it immediately shows that the right is not
absolute and can be breached in accordance with a pro-
cedure prescribed by law and in the mentioned list of
cases – relevant are the conviction by a competent court
(1, a) and detention of persons of unsound mind, alcohol
drug addicts or vagrants (1, e). In addition, in the sub-
sections of the article and in the case law of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights (ECHR), many safeguards
concerning the deprivation of liberty are also deducted
from it.37 Next to the principles of legal certainty (acces-
sibility and foreseeability) and no arbitrariness, for
example the right to have the lawfulness of the deten-
tion speedily examined by a court and the right to com-
pensation for unlawful detention. For the purpose of
this research, the most relevant elaboration of Article 5
was established in the case of Guzzardi v. Italy, where
the ECHR considered that
the difference between deprivation of and restriction
upon liberty is nonetheless merely one of degree or
intensity, and not one of nature or substance’ and
that ‘the process of classification into one or other of
these categories sometimes proves to be no easy task
in that some borderline cases are a matter of pure
opinion.38
Guzzardi was placed under special supervision with
compulsory residence on the island of Asinara, with
36. See McSherry, above n. 23, at 178.
37. See ECHR, Guide on Article 5 of the Convention. Right to Liberty and
Security, Council of Europe/ECHR (2014).
38. ECHR, Guzzardi v. Italy, Appl. No. 7367/76, 06-11-1980.
many other restrictions.39 On the basis of the actual sit-
uation on the island and cumulative and combined fac-
tors like the extremely small size of the area where he
was confined, the almost permanent supervision to
which he was subject, the all but complete impossibility
for him to make social contacts and the length of his
enforced stay resulted in the consideration that on bal-
ance the case was to be regarded as one involving depri-
vation of liberty. The court noted, ‘In certain respects
the treatment complained of resembles detention in an
“open prison” or committal to a disciplinary unit.’ It
subsequently found that there was a breach of Article 5,
sub 1 because on the basis of prevention there was no
ground for deprivation of liberty. Even the attempt of
the state to classify this mafia member as a vagrant
(sub 1, under e) failed.
Of course, this decision gives rise to testing supervision
frameworks on the safeguards of Article 5, as in an indi-
vidual case where the restrictions are so severe that they
may be considered deprivation of liberty. In literature
also, the fact that a breach of conditions in a supervision
framework may lead to ‘recalled’ detention is mentioned
as an additional rationale for this test.40 As the jurisdic-
tions in this comparative research are all subject to the
European Convention on Human Rights, their attention
for this consequence in the legislative process and in
judging individual cases of supervision is of particular
interest.
Even though restriction of liberty is not part of the Con-
vention as such, in the additional Fourth protocol, Arti-
cle 2 provides for the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose residence. As these rights are quali-
fied rights, they may be subject to restrictions if provi-
ded by law and necessary in a democratic society, for
example, to prevent (re-)offending. Of the five jurisdic-
tions in this comparison, Spain and the United King-
dom signed but never ratified this protocol, mainly on
39. In its decision, the Court further directed that the applicant should, see
n. 38:
– start looking for work within a month, establish his residence in the
prescribed locality, inform the supervisory authorities immediately of
his address and not leave the place fixed without first notifying
them;
– report to the supervisory authorities twice a day and whenever
called upon to do so;
– lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion;
– not associate with persons convicted of criminal offences and sub-
jected to preventive or security measures;
– not return to his residence later than 10 p.m. and not go out before
7 a.m., except in case of necessity and after having given notice in
due time to supervisory authorities;
– not keep or carry any arms;
– not frequent bars or night-clubs and not take part in public meet-
ings;
– inform the supervisory authorities in advance of the telephone num-
ber and name of the person telephoned or telephoning each time
he wished to make or receive a long-distance call.
40. E.g. M. Van der Wolf and M. Herzog-Evans, ‘Supervision and Detention
of Dangerous Offenders in France and the Netherlands: A Comparative
and Human Rights’ Perspective’, in M. Herzog-Evans (ed.), Offender
Release and Supervision: The Role of Courts and the Use of Discretion
(2014), 193.
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the grounds that they contained rights for migrants that
were not fully provided for in domestic law.41
The comparison will therefore show whether this makes
any difference with regard to supervision frameworks
for (sex) offenders and also whether all sorts of soft law
from European alliances is given a different significance.
Not only do different jurisdictions have different room
for manoeuvre or use different interpretations of the
leeway received from the ECHR, but because they do
not share (exactly) similar legal traditions, theoretical
discussions about a similar phenomenon may actually be
very different both in perspective and in outcome. The
aim of this research is therefore to explore legal con-
straints on the social control of sex offenders through
frameworks of supervision from a comparative perspec-
tive, focusing both on constraints from a national theo-
retical or doctrinal perspective and the interpretation of
ECHR constraints in national legal practice.
The jurisdictions that are part of this comparative proj-
ect were selected first because they all share relatively
recent or current legislative initiatives to safeguard soci-
ety against alleged dangerous (sex) offenders through
supervision frameworks. In addition, these jurisdictions
represent different legal traditions. Of course, England
(along with Wales) stands out with its common law tra-
dition and absence of a codified sentencing system. But
while other jurisdictions share the continental European
civil law tradition, these jurisdictions have different tra-
ditions in sentencing dangerous offenders. Germany
and the Netherlands have a very long and continuous
tradition of a twin-track system of criminal sanctions –
penalties and safety-measures – dating back to the grand
Classical versus Modern school debate around the turn
of the twentieth century and the authoritarian period in
the 1920s and the 1930s. Nevertheless, in terms of legal
frameworks for supervision, their systems show many
differences. Whereas Spain had a similar history, safety
measures aiming at ‘social defense’ were misused during
the Franco regime and thereafter in the 1970s discredi-
ted and abolished. Safety measures only reluctantly
reappeared in the 1990s. In France, on the other hand,
the 1970s were the heydays of the Defense Sociale Nou-
velle, leading to the adoption of safety measures. The
specific histories of these relatively more novel twin-
track systems will also show to affect their development.
As the core of this research, from all five jurisdictions
criminal law scholars with an expertise in sentencing
have written papers on this topic on the basis of a simi-
lar outline to aid the comparison. In alphabetical order
of the respective countries, Nicky Padfield wrote the
English perspective, Martine Herzog-Evans the French,
Bernd-Dieter Meier the German, Sanne Struijk and
Paul Mevis the perspective from the Netherlands, and
Lucia Martínez Garay and Jorge Correcher Mira the
Spanish. Their ‘country reports’ are the other contribu-
tions to this special issue. Up to this point, this paper
has provided the background, relevance and approach of
41. H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights, The Impact of the
ECHR on National Legal Systems (2008), at 398.
this research by means of an introduction. From here
on, the paper will present a comparative analysis of the
findings in the other papers. Evidently, not all the con-
tents in those papers will be reproduced in this analysis
nor will references be repeated; for further information,
one will have to turn to the individual contributions.
The focus will rather be on the relevant differences or
generalities for the aim of finding the possible legal con-
straints that seem to be in place to keep the social con-
trol of sex offenders in the community in check. Never-
theless, any reader who wishes to be informed in detail
on the situation in the respective jurisdictions is first
requested to read the other contributions and then
return to the remainder of this paper. The analysis pre-
sented hereafter follows the outline that can also be
observed in the other contributions. Both the questions
asked and the different, or comparable, answers will be
highlighted and discussed – without the aim of a com-
plete overview. In asking scholars to write the country
reports the comparison is intended to go beyond
description into the realm of criticism, as a means to add
to the debate of this under-debated topic.
2 Comparative Analysis
2.1 Cultural Context, Legislative Overview and
Framework for Evaluation
In all the country papers, a similar hardening of the atti-
tude towards sex offenders over recent decades is
described. As a starting point for the moral panic con-
cerning paedophiles (in England) in the introduction,
the 1980s were identified, but legislative responses to
sex offenders seem to follow from the 1990s, with Eng-
land and Wales, Germany and France as ‘early respond-
ers’. On the basis of this growing support base for meas-
ures directed at this group, in keeping with Cohen’s
theory of moral panic all authors report a (less or more
implicit) connection between legislative activity and
specific examples of societal upheaval or media contro-
versy surrounding sex offenders, for example, commit-
ting a (new) offence or re-entering the community.
While these are generally controversies at the national
level, especially in the neighbouring countries the Bel-
gian Dutroux case, discovered in 1996, is reported to
have had a transnational impact on awareness regarding
the possible severity of sexual offences towards children
and subsequent legislation. A higher rate of sex offend-
ers in prison, like in several of the jurisdictions, may also
just be related to this increased awareness, leading to
more reporting of such crimes or priority in policing.
In the context of the arsenal of measures of social con-
trol directed at sex offenders, registers are in place in
certain countries. In England since the 1997 Sex
Offenders Act, in Germany, for example, on a State lev-
el, and in Spain since 2015, especially directed at pro-
viding information for determining the possibility of
working (with minors) after release. These provisions
confirm the stigma of sex offenders within the broader
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group of offenders. In theory, in all countries the mental
health system may be used to control (potential) sex
offenders when meeting the criteria for the respective
measures, possibly also as a result of the fact that the
criminal justice system and mental system are often
interwoven inter alia through placement provisions.
Because of a lack of statistics this has to remain a
hypothesis for now. Schemes such as exist in some US
states that aimed at preventive detention of post-sen-
tence sex offenders through mental health law do not
seem to be in place.42 However, a German act under civ-
il law from 2010 (Therapy and Placement of Mentally
Disturbed Violent Offenders Act) shows similarities. It
was meant as a makeshift after the retroactive applica-
tion of indefinite post-sentence preventive detention
was interpreted by the ECHR as amounting to the ret-
roactive imposition of a heavier penalty incompatible
with the convention. The act allows placement in closed
institutions for those considered to be of unsound mind
and if there is a high probability that they will affect the
life, personal integrity, freedom, or sexual self-determi-
nation of others so that their placement is considered
necessary for public protection.
It is recognized that legislative changes directed at sex
offenders include those in substantive law increasing the
criminalization of various forms of sexual conduct,
sometimes distancing the harm principle in favour of a
more moral conception of criminal wrongdoing. Posses-
sion of virtual child pornography may be an example
thereof, and its facultative status with regard to crimi-
nalization in treaties from the Council of Europe, seems
to recognize this doctrinal vulnerability.43 The widening
scope of sexual offences is often accompanied by
increasing the possible penalty for such offences. In that
sense, the increased punitivity of sex offences is merely
part of the wider development in criminal politics in the
researched countries, explained in the Spanish contribu-
tion as ‘punitive populism’. The term refers to the wide-
spread idea that these legislative reactions are only
responding to the societal upheaval, but not the real
problems and needs concerning criminal policy, which
are obscure anyway by lack of a serious analysis or
empirical evidence. Most of the authors not only report
that this has evoked much doctrinal resistance, but also
point out that this is directed less at preventive supervi-
sion as neither explicitly punitive nor detention.
Turning to legal frameworks (partly) aimed at prevent-
ing (also) sexual reoffending in the community, in gen-
eral five types of frameworks can be distinguished. The
first is through community-based punishments or
release on parole/conditional release of a sentence of
imprisonment. The second, in the continental jurisdic-
tions that separate punishment from (safety) measures
in doctrine, is through the imposition of a conditional/
42. See J.S. Blackman and K. Dring, Sexual Aggression against Children.
Pedophiles’ and Abusers’ Development, Dynamics, Treatability, and
the Law (2016), chapter 10.
43. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of Children against
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (2007/2010) and Convention on
Cybercrime (2001/2004).
suspended measure of often post-sentence preventive
detention or a conditional release from preventive
detention (including extensive frameworks of leave).
The third is, in jurisdictions with a similar doctrine,
independent measures of often post-custody or even
post-sentence supervision under criminal law, including
high-intensity and extended supervision after early
release. The fourth is civil preventative orders (in some
jurisdictions called the realm of administrative law); in
the jurisdiction that does not have (safety) measures as a
sanction distinct from punishment, such as in England
and Wales, these orders seem to serve as an alternative.
The fact that breaches of these orders are criminal
offences demonstrates that. The fifth, only in England
and Wales, is post-sentence supervision under Multi-
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA).
These are ‘simply’ arrangements between police, proba-
tion and prison services to coordinate the management
of dangerous offenders in the community. Based in leg-
islation, the formulated duty to cooperate for institu-
tions involved in providing health, housing, social serv-
ices, education, social arrangements, employment and
electronic monitoring includes a legal basis for supervi-
sion and control post-release and even post-sentence.
That the common law jurisdiction of England and
Wales does not have a criminal or sentencing code is
probably partly to blame for the custom in the last deca-
des to create and adopt in a high-frequency new ‘acts’,
named after the objective: Sex Offenders Act 1997; Sex-
ual Offences Act 2003; Criminal Justice Act 2003;
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008; Legal Aid,
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012;
Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014; Anti-Social Behav-
iour; Crime and Policing Act 2014; etcetera. The Eng-
lish contribution shows that new legal frameworks are
created and existing frameworks often adapted, for
example, with regard to different types of sentences of
indeterminate custody as well as specific civil preventa-
tive orders for sex offenders, such as Sexual Harm Pre-
vention Orders (SHPO) and Sexual Risk Orders, which
in 2015 replaced the somewhat narrower Sexual Offen-
ces Prevention Orders and Risk of Sexual Harm Orders.
In the French contribution nonetheless, even though
historically one of the frontrunners in the codification of
law, a similar legislative ‘frenzy’ is presented. The dif-
ference with England and Wales is, however, that all
these adaptations are directly visible in the current code,
while over the channel it is even difficult for scholars to
make out which elements of acts are still applicable and
which have been altered by later acts. In France, a ‘true
life’ sentence was created in 1994 after a paedosexual
killing. The Dutroux case triggered the enactment of
‘socio-judicial supervision’ (suivi socio-judiciaire – SSJ)
in 1998, consisting of mandatory treatment and supervi-
sion both possible as a stand-alone community sentence
and post-custodial supervision. A decade later, four
‘safety measures’ had been added to the arsenal: ‘judicial
safety surveillance of dangerous offenders’ (Surveillance
judiciaire des personnes dangereuses – SJPD), ‘GPS-elec-
tronic monitoring’ (Placement sous surveillance électroni-
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que mobile – PSEM), ‘safety surveillance’ (Surveillance
de sûreté – SS), and ‘safety detention’ (Rétention de sûreté
– RS), followed in 2014 by a measure focusing on
diminished responsible mentally disordered offenders,
some of whom were thought to be sex offenders.
As the German sanctioning system has long and contin-
uously had safety measures in place with preventive
detention (Sicherungsverwahrung) and supervision (Füh-
rungssicht), the legislative changes that followed from
1998 (with the Act to combat sexual offences and other
dangerous offences) onward aimed at adapting these
provisions generally to widen their scope of applicability
or intensifying the possible control. The supervision is
in fact a form of high-intensity and extended parole for
persons with a high-risk prognosis after a prison sen-
tence or preventive detention of a certain length. Since
1998, it is an indeterminate measure as before it was
restricted to a maximum of five years. Also since then,
the constraints for the imposition and execution of
supervision are lower in the case of convicted sex
offenders than they are in other cases. While supervision
is regularly put into operation upon release from prison
after having served at least two years, it is only one year
in the case of sex offenders; and the duration of supervi-
sion may be extended for life in the case of convicted sex
offenders (and a second, very small group of offenders)
if the offender has been sentenced to two years of
imprisonment and after release either violates a direc-
tion or ‘other specific circumstances give reason to
believe that there may be a danger to the general public
by the commission of further serious offences’. These
legislative changes have created an exceptionally weaker
legal position for convicted sex offenders in comparison
with other offenders.
In the Netherlands, the safety measure of preventive
detention for diminished responsible offenders has simi-
larly been in place since what is called the authoritarian
period in the 1920s and 1930s. As the mental disorders
considered eligible for imposition of such an entrust-
ment order (Terbeschikkingstelling – TBS) are defined in
broad terms, it has always been the sanction to harvest
sex offenders considered dangerous. Different from
Germany, there has never been an indeterminate stand-
alone safety measure of supervision in place – a fixed
and short-term location or contact ban order was enac-
ted in 2012 – until in 2015 the order of long-term super-
vision, continuing after prison or a TBS-order, was
adopted by parliament. Up until now (November 2016),
the order has not been enacted. As dangerous offenders
were considered to be in the TBS-system, the need for
supervision in the community has been organized
through an extensive system of leave and the instalment
of conditional release in 1997, the maximum term of
which has been changed from three to nine years in
2007, while the same adopted act of the stand-alone
measures also contains the possibility of the unlimited
prolonging of conditional release from TBS, as well as
that of conditional release from prison.
In Spain, although the punitivity of sex offences and the
evolution of a new twin-track system had been on the
rise since the mid-1990s, some incidents in the
mid-2000s caused enough alarma social to also adopt a
supervision order. In 2010, the safety measure of ‘super-
vised release’ was enacted for post-prison control of sex
offenders and terrorists.
In order to find the current legal constraints governing
supervision, the authors of the respective countries were
asked to evaluate the legal frameworks for post-sentence
supervision in their jurisdiction both de jure and de facto
in light of the national legal theory doctrine on sentenc-
ing, the principles of proportionality and least intrusive
means, and the national position on the human rights
framework of the ECHR.
2.2 Evaluation in Light of Sentencing Theory
In the schemes this study focuses on, three elements in
particular raise questions in light of sentencing theory:
first of all the fact that they are mainly post-sentence,
second that they are often indeterminate, and third that
they merely consist of restriction of liberty.
Concerning the first question, in the English perspec-
tive, Padfield raises the question why public protection
justifies post-sentence ‘punishment’? ‘What, in fact, do
we mean by “post-sentence” punishment – if the
offender is still being “controlled”, should this be con-
sidered as post-sentence or as part of the punishment,
part of the sentence?’ In this study, England and Wales
is the only jurisdiction that has not adopted at some
point in history a twin-track system of sentencing in
which dogmatically punishment is regarded as domi-
nantly retrospective and retributive, while safety meas-
ures are dominantly prospective and preventative in
nature. It explains the questions raised, which on the
continent would be replied with a simple statement: ‘a
safety measure is in theory not considered punishment’.
Obviously, the English rejoinder would be that you
could give it a different name on paper, but ‘if it looks
like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a
duck …’. Indeed, the theoretical notion that the experi-
enced suffering in preventive detention is different from
that in prison as it is not ‘intended’ will sound ridicu-
lous to the detainee at hand. The English perspective
also shows that the discussion on retribution versus pre-
vention is predominantly drawn into that on the purpo-
ses of sentencing leading to a variety of indeterminate
sentences, while for exclusively preventive measures
civil orders can come into play. Again for the ‘offender’,
the restrictions will feel similarly punitive and criminal
in nature.
In the German perspective, Meier explains how in the
Classical school tradition in continental European juris-
dictions punishment was governed by the guilt principle
and thus administered to the extent of guilt. Condi-
tional/suspended sentencing and conditional release/
parole were among the first triumphs attributed to the
Modern school around the turn of the twentieth centu-
ry, whose deterministic view of man shifted the focus
prospectively to prevention and rehabilitation. Even
though the Modern school was internationally united in
the Internationale Kriminalistische Vereinigung, the way
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in which a compromise was formed with the Classical
school through a twin-track system differs between the
continental jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, for exam-
ple, precondition for the Classical school to accept the
compromise was to only enact indeterminate preventive
detention for mentally disordered offenders who could
not be held (fully) responsible for their crimes. Other
than in Germany and France, the Dutch do not have a
measure of indeterminate preventive detention for fully
responsible offenders, although in practice the disorder
criterion is interpreted in a way that, for example,
regarding sex offenders more or less the same sort of
people fall under its scope. In Spain, a similar approach
seems to have been taken in the 1990s, when the twin-
track system was re-introduced with historical lessons
learned. The aim of the introduced measures was reha-
bilitation rather than security, the duration was subject
to strict limits of proportionality (with the alternative
prison sentence as reference) and the execution order
was safety measure before (and counting as) the prison
sentence.
This hybrid between the two tracks – a blurry system
also observed in France – corresponds with the Dutch
pragmatic changes to the system over the past century,
through which sentences can now be disproportionate to
the extent of guilt on grounds of prevention and safety
measures may be terminated as disproportionate to the
severity of the offence and corresponding prison sen-
tence. So when it was argued in Spain that the long lack
of safety measures – like in England and Wales – had
blurred the concept of punishment, the Dutch showed
that both tracks can be blurred while existing next to
each other. From a dogmatic perspective, Germany
seems to remain as the most distinct twin-track system
trough upholding the principle of punishment to the
extent of guilt, even though for measures the law
requires ‘proportionality to the seriousness of the com-
mitted offence or the expected offence’.
The indeterminacy of the frameworks is self-evident in
a strict twin-track system because the duration should
be proportionate to the aim of public protection and
other than guilt dangerousness is not determined retro-
spectively. All authors mention, however, the limited
validity of risk assessment, which seems to call for cau-
tion concerning the indeterminate duration of a meas-
ure. Emphasizing the seriousness of the committed
offence may also be done out of diagnostic deliberations
as an expression of the robust empirical finding that past
behaviour is still the best predictor for future behaviour.
Procedural safeguards, such as judicial review on pro-
longation, are generally also part of the counterbalance
to that uncertainty. But in Spain, for example, the
framework for supervision is deliberately not indetermi-
nate, again safeguarding proportionality from the per-
spective of legal protection against the (experienced
misuse of) State power. In the Netherlands, the measure
of long-term supervision would be the first safety meas-
ure of indeterminate duration not limited to mentally
disordered offenders. This has crossed a theoretical bor-
der in a sense that the label of mental disorder suggests
to ensure treatment, which could be considered a posi-
tive obligation of effort to avoid the possible indetermi-
nacy. This suggests that the fact that supervision is not
considered as invasive as detention may be used as an
argument to cross existing theoretical borders. The
Spanish authors seem to acknowledge this suggestion as
well.
Even without the requirement of mental disorder, reha-
bilitative aims are reported in several jurisdictions as a
complimentary justification for safety measures next to
public protection (and treatment). Of course this does
not mean that rehabilitative or treatment-considerations
may determine the continuation or termination of the
measure, as in the past has been the case in the Nether-
lands. In jurisdictions like Germany and Spain, rehabili-
tation seems to be most strictly engrained in law as the
objective of the sentencing system. All authors express
the concern, however, that in practice supervision will
be used to control more than to treat or rehabilitate giv-
en the fact that the latter is much more costly in terms
of financial and personnel resources.
The prospective focus of safety measures is not only
reported – most strongly in the French contribution by
Herzog-Evans – to be prone to conflict with proportion-
ality, but also with legality. The element of prohibition
of retrospective implementation of law is mentioned,
but the ECHR has limited the relevance of Article 7 in
regard to ‘harsher punishment’ as not to include
changes to provisions regarding the execution of a sanc-
tion (at the expense of the individual undergoing that
sanction), for example, in the case of Kafkaris v. Cyprus
(2008). More important is the question whether safety
measures may be imposed because of dangerousness
without an established offence or after serving a sen-
tence for an established offence. Among the mentioned
English preventative orders based on the risk of sexual
harm, the former and latter are observed because a con-
viction is not always required but merely an ‘act of a
sexual nature’, while the order may be imposed free
standing, even after the sentence. As these orders are
civil in nature, some high-principled standards of crimi-
nal law may be bypassed to an extent, such as a lower
burden of proof. In Germany, preventive detention
could be imposed post-sentence until the ECHR amen-
ded that. For supervision, it is still possible, but in gen-
eral supervision applies by default after a prison sen-
tence or preventive detention of a certain length. Anoth-
er aspect of the encounters of the Sicherungsverwahrung
with the ECHR is also related to legality in way; as the
safety measure proceeds for a long time, the established
offence is being distanced in a way that it gradually
diminishes as a justification for further deprivation of
liberty. As related to Article 5 ECHR, this will be
addressed in paragraph 2.5. Again this suggests that for
supervision, these theoretical borders may be crossed
more easily.
The fact that frameworks of supervision are considered
restriction of liberty instead of deprivation of liberty has
not yet raised other theoretical questions than the
above-mentioned suggestions that some theoretical con-
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straints may be less rigid for a less intrusive measure. In
the German perspective, Meier, for example, notes that
the depth of intrusion of a measure has to match the
degree of dangerousness so the risk requirement may be
less high for supervision than detention. Apart from
Cohen’s opposite view on the intrusiveness on both
frameworks, it is important to note that supervision may
involve deprivation of liberty. For example, treatment in
a mental hospital may be a condition. Conditions are
generally not coerced but enforced through sanctions on
breaching conditions, with (recall to) deprivation of lib-
erty as the sanction. And with recalled deprivation of
liberty, warnings of backdoor sentencing, double or
additional punishment surface in doctrine in the respec-
tive countries. In the English perspective, a case is men-
tioned in which a breach of a civil order was punished
with initially four and after appeal three years, which
Padfield considers putting the lie to the distinction
between civil and criminal sanctions.
2.3 Legal Frameworks for Indeterminate
Supervision: Evaluation of Proportionality
The principle of proportionality regarding measures is
described in the German perspective as consisting of
four elements: legitimacy of the aim, suitability to
achieve the aim, necessity to achieve the aim, and ade-
quacy considering the competing interests. The third
element of necessity entails that the aim cannot be
reached by less intrusive means, which are at hand in
the arsenal of social control, and will be addressed in the
next paragraph. The legitimacy of the aim of public pro-
tection is not in question in any jurisdiction, and so in
this paragraph mainly the elements of suitability and
adequacy are evaluated.
The suitability of the respective frameworks in achiev-
ing the aim incorporates an analysis of their pre-legisla-
tive justification. In the introduction, a variety of loose
to strong connections to incidents concerning sex
offenders that caused societal upheaval has been estab-
lished as a trigger for legislation. The recent adoption of
a supervision order in the Netherlands was strongly
related to incidents concerning the re-entry of sex
offenders in the community. This seems to explain why
novel restrictions as a ban to live in certain areas or a
duty to move are part of these provisions. The added
value of the possibly life-long order was also explained
by the government with regard to the offence of posses-
sion of child pornography, which due to proportionality
deliberations could only lead to preventive detention for
a maximum of four years (without the option of an
extension for conditional release). In the Dutch contri-
bution, the authors question the proportionality of the
order related to the problem referring to the expected
low numbers of execution of the order, an expected low
success rate and the costs of required resources, in par-
ticular related to the empirical finding that societal
upheaval concerning re-entry of sex offenders only
occurs in a small minority of cases and generally disap-
pears quickly.
The enactment of supervised release in Spain in 2010
was in part connected to specific sexual offences. It was
aimed at terrorists and sex offenders and later widened
to apply to certain violent offenders. It was scrutinized
both for being unnecessary given the low level of violent
and sexual offending rates in Spain and for being too
soft and thus ineffective in protecting the public against
sex offenders. The French SSJ was justified through the
somewhat opposing objectives of neutralisation, rehabil-
itation and treatment. Whereas the first two are fought
over by different political views, there is consensus
about the idea that sex offenders, the initial target
group, need treatment, more so than the group of vio-
lent offenders which was added later. The order and fol-
lowing safety measures could also be deemed necessary
because in France the sentences for sex offenders are
quite lenient, with an average of eight years for rapists.
In England, as mentioned, some of the acts in recent
history changing the sentencing system as well as some
of the civil preventative orders are – also by name – des-
ignated for (future) sex offenders. In Germany, the
supervision order has known a longer history, but the
data suggest that sex offenders form a large part of the
population.
As all the above-mentioned frameworks of supervision
are aimed at prevention, the suggestion is that sex
offenders pose a significant danger to society. All
authors consider dangerousness a dangerous concept
because of the limited predictive validity of (state-of-
the-art) risk assessment. Empirical findings are presen-
ted to suggest that risk of reoffending is overestimated
in general, through methodological flaws in assessment
(such as a low base rate) or in reaction to societal
upheaval in case of reoffending (false negatives). The
assumption that sex offenders are at a higher risk of
reoffending than other offenders cannot be validated by
empirical data, which are subsequently lacking in pre-
legislative justifications. Our knowledge does not yet
distinguish amongst the group of sex offenders the char-
acteristics of those actually posing a high risk for re-
offending. Therefore, harsher restrictions on the broad
group of sex offenders than on other offenders do not
seem to be proportionate in terms of suitability to the
intended aim of public protection. Moreover, all authors
of the country contributions suggest that this double
overestimation of risk and the plausible high number of
false positives as a consequence is an additional problem
in that respect.
The adequacy of the frameworks of supervision requires
weighing the hardships of the individual, or the depth of
intrusion of the supervision, against the gains of the
public, the likelihood and seriousness of further offences
if no supervision would be executed. This evaluation
requires both the law in books and the law in action.
How is the law defined, in terms of criteria for imposi-
tion, duration, the kind of restrictive conditions or
directions that can be put in place and the procedural
safeguards governing the process? And how are these
legal possibilities used in practice, applied in individual
cases of sex offenders and with what effect?
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Apart from the exceptions explained in paragraph 2.2,
an offence of a certain seriousness is required for most
frameworks of supervision. In the French perspective,
for example, is spoken of a very restricted list of
extremely serious offences. Sometimes, the imposition
of supervision is indirectly related to the seriousness of
the offence through a requirement of the length of the
prison sentence or the preventive detention, like in Ger-
many. This is comparable in the Netherlands although
the prison sentence has had to be imposed for an offence
against the inviolability of the body, meaning a violent
or sex offence. As in Spain, the framework is supervised
‘release’ – it only applies to offences for which parole is
in place and is mandatory for sex offences. In England
and Wales, Sexual Harm Prevention Orders are for
those who were convicted or cautioned for a ‘relevant’
offence not necessarily a sex offence – Serious Risk
Orders just require ‘an act of a sexual nature’ – as long
as there is a risk for sexual harm. This definition shows
that in addition to past behaviour generally a dangerous-
ness criterion is required. In countries with many possi-
ble measures, the definition of dangerousness may differ
per framework, more or less proportionate to the intru-
siveness of the corresponding restrictions. In France, for
example, the criterion may either be absent (for SSJ,
just committing a violent or sex offence suffices), ‘dan-
gerousness’, ‘particular dangerousness’ or a ‘proven risk
of recidivism’. ‘Particular’ refers to ‘a high probability of
recidivism because of a serious personality disorder’,
and as in France psychoanalysis is still dominant ‘per-
version’ is regarded as a personality disorder and is most
often used. ‘Proven’ refers to expert testimony, but evi-
dence-based risk assessment is neither required nor val-
ued. In Spain, the criterion itself refers to the testimony:
‘prediction about the future behaviour of the subject
that states that he will probably commit new crimes’.
Nevertheless, the law omits to require expert testimony
for supervised release. For the German supervision
order, a prognosis of high risk is necessary. In England
and Wales, before 2015 the criterion for the mentioned
civil orders was a risk of ‘serious’ sexual harm as if there
was any other kind. Currently, the definition is risk of
sexual harm to the public in the United Kingdom or
children or vulnerable adults abroad. In the Nether-
lands, imposition of the supervision order requires an
easily met general public safety criterion, but execution
requires risk of recidivism of an offence serious enough
for imposition of the order, or risk for ‘seriously damag-
ing behaviour towards victims or witnesses.’ For this
last criterion, only a risk assessment by the Probation
Services is needed.
The Dutch criteria show a twofold procedure of imposi-
tion by the court at sentencing and a court decision of
execution at the end of custody in which the initial
duration and specific restrictions are formulated. In
Spain, a similar twofold procedure exists, although it is
not the Public Prosecutor but the Court for Penitentiary
Control (CPC) requesting the execution. In Germany,
only as an exception could it be a judge imposing super-
vision because the main route is by default after the
mentioned custodial sanctions. In England and Wales,
an SHPO may be imposed at the time of sentencing or
on free-standing application to the magistrates’ court by
the police or National Crime Agency; for a Sexual Risk
Order, only the latter situation is available. In France,
SSJ is imposed by the sentencing court, while the other
safety measures are imposed (after custody) by the judge
in charge of the execution of sanctions (juge de l’applica-
tion des peines – JAP) or a special chamber of the court of
appeal.
Concerning the duration of the measure, the distinction
must be made between an initial duration and a maxi-
mum duration. Spain is the only country in which there
is in fact no indeterminate, or possibly life-long, super-
vision order. The duration of supervised release lasts
between one and five years, or between five and a maxi-
mum of ten years, depending on the seriousness of the
offence. At least annually the CPC should make a pro-
posal to the court to terminate or change the restric-
tions. In France, SSJ has a maximum duration of ten
years for felonies, twenty years for crimes, thirty years
by special decision and can be perpetual for lifers. How-
ever, through the safety measure of Safety Surveillance
supervision can be prolonged for two years and renewed
ad infinitum. Concerning SSJ, the JAP decides whether
to review the order periodically or to entirely delegate
supervision to the probation service. The German
supervision can be of determinate duration between two
and five years, or indeterminate if there is no coopera-
tion with the treatment and a risk for serious reoffend-
ing. With a fixed duration, judicial review is every six
months, with indeterminate duration of two years. The
Dutch supervision order may be imposed and prolonged
for a period of two, three, four or five years, which is
then also the term for review. The civil orders in Eng-
land and Wales are imposed for determined periods
with a minimum duration, which may be repeated at the
end of that period. At the request of the individual or
the police, the court can also order to prolong, alter or
terminate the measure.
With regard to the kind of restrictions that can be put in
place, the civil preventative orders have no constraints
in law. The law requires the individual to notify the
police of his or her name and address, including where
this information changes. Of the countries in which the
restrictions are specified in law, it is ominous that most
restrictions focus on control, such as notification, loca-
tion or contact bans, controlled by electronic monitoring
– in France, this is a possible additional safety meas-
ure – and labour or housing restrictions. Less restric-
tions are rehabilitative in nature, like a duty to partici-
pate in (possibly clinical) treatment, to do educational
programmes or find a job. Paying damages is a kind of
restorative condition. Herzog-Evans notes that in
France the restrictions are not so different from parole,
but the difference with release and most community
sentences is that for safety measures no consent is
needed, possibly also lowering the rehabilitative effect.
Breaching the condition may result in a maximum pris-
on sentence of six months in the Netherlands, one year
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in Spain, three years in Germany and five years in Eng-
land and Wales. In France, in regard to SSJ the possible
sanction on breaching a restriction is pre-determined by
the sentencing court and can be up to three years if the
initial offence was a felony and seven years if it was a
crime. However, the JAP is in charge of implementation
and can decide to partially implement the pre-deter-
mined sanction.
The fact that sanctions can be combined at sentencing
may lead to a situation in which first a prison sentence
may be followed by a long period of preventive deten-
tion and later supervision. If the prison sentence was
short because of the seriousness of the committed
offence and extent of guilt, what followed will be con-
sidered disproportionate sooner, even though from a
preventive point of view the seriousness of a possible
further offence is leading. In jurisdictions where orders
can be made free-standing, all sorts of concurrence
between legal frameworks may occur. In the English
perspective, some guidance is given, especially also by a
court of appeal decision stating that next to an indeter-
minate sentence a civil preventative order is generally
unnecessary. Nevertheless, the question is raised wheth-
er a judge in charge of the execution, like in France or
Spain, would be helpful in this respect.
In the literature mentioned in the introduction, it was
merely suggested that supervision would not be illegiti-
mate as long as there were procedural safeguards in
place. Of course, for impositions during sentencing,
ordinary due process principles of criminal procedure
regulations pertaining to sentencing will be in place.
The twofold procedure in the Netherlands and Spain is
itself a procedural safeguard. All countries seem to have
possibilities for appeal, recurring and/or the option of
demanding judicial review in place in the stage of execu-
tion. Imposition after the sentence may require addi-
tional safeguards, as is the case regarding French safety
measures. One example is the required three layers of
risk assessment for most safety measures: (a) by an
expert; (b) after a placement of up to six weeks in clini-
cal environment; and (c) by a so-called multidisciplinary
commission for safety measures. Probably only in the
Netherlands, and England and Wales may evidence-
based risk assessment instrument be mandatory. Coun-
ter-expertise however is generally only paid for by the
government if the court finds it necessary, although in
the adversarial system in England and Wales it might be
considered more of a right.
These safeguards will be important because in a few
contributions studies are mentioned that found that a
lack of experienced procedural fairness may actually
increase the risk of recidivism (during supervision), just
as isolation does, which may be the case if control is not
combined with counselling, treatment, social support
and a focus on ‘the realisation of meaningful lives’
instead of ‘the prevention of risks’, needed for supervi-
sion to have the required effect. Therefore, how the
legal framework is applied in practice will be more
important for the evaluation of adequacy.
Two types of empirical data would be of interest in this
evaluation: data on the frequency of application of the
supervision orders and data on their effectiveness in
reducing reoffending. As the Dutch order has not been
enacted yet, no data exist. There are no data for Spain as
well, since the order was enacted in 2010 and is imposed
at sentencing in combination with custody and executed
thereafter. In the other countries where supervision has
a longer history, the authors of the contributions com-
plain about a lack of data, nonetheless. However, Ger-
man data suggest that supervision is imposed more for
five years than for two years, revealing that the courts
seem to act risk oriented. In France on the other hand,
courts seem to be more cautious from the perspective of
liberties of the individual. SSJ is far from being system-
atically imposed on sex offenders. The data also show
that with a mean duration of six years paedosexual
offenders are longer under supervision than other sex
offenders. Electronic monitoring is not often used, but if
it is used it is on a sex offender in a large majority of the
cases. In a recall study from a few years ago, a figure of
25% was established. In England and Wales studies
show an effect in reducing reconvictions of violent and
sex offenders after the introduction of MAPPA. But
more recent data show an increase of cautions, reconvic-
tions and/or recall on licence, under MAPPA or with
civil orders. This at least seems to suggest a shift
towards control instead of support.
In Spain, the biggest concern regarding an effective
practice is the lack of a designated authority to carry out
the control: ‘a supervised release without a supervisor’.
This is only one aspect of the lack of adequate resources,
urging Martínez Garay and Correcher Mira to say that
effective management of sex offenders in the communi-
ty will only be possible if the legal framework is backed
up by these resources. Even though the situation in
other countries may not be as desperate, most authors
echo this concern. For example, in France, cooperation
between the different services is not like under
MAPPA.
Especially in France, and England and Wales, the judi-
ciary has aided in drawing borders concerning the pro-
portionality of certain restrictions in individual cases. As
suggested by the data, the judiciary is cautious in
restricting liberties, although sex offenders are generally
the most restricted group, judging by a finding concern-
ing contact bans. However, concerning electronic moni-
toring administrative courts have urged the prison serv-
ices to refrain from serious infringements on the private
lives of those under monitoring: for example, being
awakened several times during the night as a direct
result of the poor technology used. Also, bans or con-
trols on use of computers or the Internet are only
allowed if it is established that a non-contact sex offence
(such as downloading child pornography) has been com-
mitted. A similar ruling was made by a court of appeal
in England and Wales in 2015. A blanket prohibition on
computer use or the Internet access is disproportionate
because it restricts the defendant in the use of what is
nowadays an essential part of everyday living for a large
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proportion of the public, as well as a requirement of
much employment. Moreover, a direction under a civil
order relating to activity with children should be justi-
fied by demonstrating that the risk is not already catered
for by other regulations. In another 2015 case, directions
prohibiting contact with minors were too stringent and
reformulated to incorporate a clause like ‘such as is
inadvertent and not reasonably avoidable in the course
of lawful daily life’. In a 2010 case, the UK Supreme
Court had already ruled that indefinite notification
requirements were disproportionate, leading to the pos-
sibility of appeal after being on the register for a very
long time. However, those under SHPOs may not
appeal. In a Dutch case, a civil court in summary pro-
ceedings explicitly ruled that two of the restrictive con-
ditions imposed on a conditionally released offender
– an area restraining order with associated electronic
monitoring for five municipalities – were disproportion-
ate. These rulings suggest that restrictions should be
proportionate also as not to hinder rehabilitation too
much.
2.4 Place among Other Sentences and
Preventative Measures: Evaluation of
Alternative Less Intrusive Means
Are the legal frameworks for indeterminate supervision,
and their practical utilization, considered necessary in
addition to all other – possibly less intrusive – alterna-
tives? Especially concerning new legislation of such
frameworks, the government should justify that the aim
of public protection cannot be reached through existing
means. Otherwise, as Struijk and Mevis underline,
additional community sanctions are an unnecessary wid-
ening and strengthening of the net of social control. As
the different characters of the respective legal frame-
works for supervision are now known well enough, this
paragraph will elaborate on the main alternatives.
As is pointed out in the English and French perspective,
despite the existence of alternatives most sex offenders
will just pass through prison. As many frameworks of
supervision focus on necessary control after custody, the
apparent observation is that imprisonment itself does
not reduce dangerousness, probably on the contrary. In
the Spanish perspective most prominently, a reference
is made to studies that show a risk-reducing effect for a
significant percentage of sex offenders after rehabilita-
tion treatments received during prison sentence. Never-
theless, in most of the studied countries treatment pro-
grammes are not nationally implemented. In France
they are, but Herzog-Evans is critical about their lacking
of an evidence base. In England and Wales, sex offend-
ers are generally required to do courses, but they mainly
go through the system with many queues and delayed
advances in placement or hearings. In a case of an inde-
terminate sentence, it was ruled that such delays breach-
ed the ‘right’ to rehabilitation in showing that there is
no longer a present danger. Indeed supervision may be
needed less if sex offenders left prison more rehabilita-
ted than is the case now. The Spanish authors consider
the lack of rehabilitative programs in deep contrast with
their constitutional aim of rehabilitation. After prison,
no legal options or programmes are in place other than
sporadic initiatives for volunteers like Circles of Sup-
port and Accountability, which does have an established
preventive effect.
Of course, if the released sex offenders meet the criteria
of mental health law, they could be coerced to commit-
ment in a mental hospital and/or medication. As men-
tioned, a lack of data leads only the hypothesis of sex
offenders controlled in that way. In some countries,
such as France, through flexible placement provisions it
is also possible to place sex offenders in secured mental
health facilities during the time of the sentence. This
could be used to reduce reoffending risk, but in the
Netherlands, for example, this is generally only used as
crisis interventions.
Restrictions on liberty in the community can be reached
through other legal frameworks. Of course, other crimi-
nal sentences than custody may be used as an alterna-
tive, like conditional or suspended sentences or release
as the most obvious. But in most jurisdictions, accessory
sentences also may be imposed (in addition). In Spain,
these can be imposed because of dangerousness, and
some scholars consider them safety measures. In the
German legal system, similar restrictions are possible
under police laws, based on the duties of the police to
ensure security (or public order) through security law as
part of administrative law. The danger must be more
concrete than under criminal law, but Meier doubts
whether such restrictions are less intrusive. Also in the
Netherlands, restrictions are possible under administra-
tive law, but not as restrictive as the supervision order
under criminal law.
The recently adopted Dutch supervision order was
explicitly justified by the legislator as necessary to fill
existing gaps in legislation. As traditionally dangerous
offenders are addressed through the TBS-order, possi-
bly also imposed conditionally, it was deemed problem-
atic that TBS has recently been less imposed because
defendants refuse to cooperate with the required (per-
sonality) assessment. This leads to evaluators refraining
from giving an advice, which leads to less impositions
even though law allows for imposition, nonetheless.
This suggest that dangerous offenders who should be in
TBS are now just serving sentences, and therefore the
government needed supervision afterwards. The prob-
lem, however, is not addressed at its roots. Defendants
do not want to receive a TBS-order because the mean
length of duration has risen to eight-plus years.
Attempts to reduce this length are underway, but the
possible result of less ‘refusers’ is not awaited. Another
gap is considered the maximized TBS at four years for
non-violent offenders, such as hands-off sex offences.
Again, the problem could be solved by abolishing that
modality. In terms of less intrusive means, it is interest-
ing that along with the supervision order, the perpetual
prolongation of parole after prison for dangerous
offenders and the perpetual prolongation of conditional
release from TBS preventive detention were adopted.
These two changes seem to cover many gaps, and their
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results could have been awaited before introducing the
supervision order. Finally, as mentioned the societal
upheaval concerning re-entry of sex offenders seemed
necessary to address, even though in practice mayors of
Dutch towns already use civil proceedings for imposing
supervisory conditions on presumed dangerous ex-
offenders returning to their community. This some-
times works as long as the time for conditional release
has expired and the conditions are not too severe. A
more severe option under civil law is the mentioned
makeshift placement in closed institutions of preventive
detainees considered to be of unsound mind, after the
ECHR ruled the retrospective post-sentence imposition
of their preventive detention incompatible with the con-
vention. The question is, however, whether similar or
any other constraints from a human rights perspective
seem to control supervision.
2.5 Evaluation from a Human Rights
Perspective
In the introduction (paragraph 1.4), the framework for
this evaluation has already been given. In the mentioned
Guzzardi-case, it was adopted that restrictions may be
so severe as to amount to deprivation of liberty. In such
a case, the safeguards of Article 5 ECHR come into play.
Have the national legislators or judiciary in a single case
ever tested restrictions through a supervision framework
against the requirements of Article 5 ECHR? Or are
restrictions measured against Article 2 Protocol 4 or
other protected rights or liberties in the convention?
And what other human rights documents – possibly soft
law – are considered?
Although the studied jurisdictions have different ways
of integrating the ECHR and subsequent case law in
national law – described in the respective contributions
– the ECHR and its subsequent case law are taken at
heart – although in some countries more often by schol-
ars than judiciary, let alone government. That this is not
restricted to case law regarding their own country is
demonstrated by the fact that almost all authors of the
country contributions mention case law on Article 5
regarding the German situation (of preventive deten-
tion). As described, in this case law some elaborated
safeguards relevant for preventive frameworks were for-
mulated. Concerning the grounds for deprivation of
freedom there has to be a ‘sufficient causal connection
between the conviction and the deprivation of liberty at
issue’ (1, a). The ground of ‘when it is reasonably con-
sidered necessary to prevent his committing an offence’
(1, c) only applies to pre-trial detention and not custody
for preventive purposes without the person concerned
being suspected of having already committed a criminal
offence (Ostendorf v. Germany 2013).
It can be argued that as the causal relation is progres-
sively weakened as the preventive detention continues,
in order to keep perspective the execution should be dis-
tanced from a prison sentence (in special facilities –
compare the French decision on the internal regulations
in Fresnes) and possibly a requirement of ‘unsound
mind’ (1, e) should be in place (like in the Dutch TBS-
order); compare the mentioned German makeshift when
retroactive imposition of preventive detention was con-
sidered a heavier penalty incompatible with the legality
requirements of Article 7 ECHR. That article also
requires foreseeability, while Article 4 Protocol 7 states
the right not to be punished twice.
A supervisory framework would only have to comply
with these and other safeguards of Article 5 if its restric-
tions (in a single case) are to be considered a deprivation
of liberty. The fact that the Guzzardi case is not men-
tioned by the legislator or judiciary may be consoling, in
the sense that no restrictions of such severity are ever
used, or worrying in the sense that people are not aware
of the fact that restriction of liberty can turn into depri-
vation of liberty. In the Netherlands, concerning the
legal requirement of one year of conditional release from
TBS, if the dangerousness criterion is not met judiciary
tends to impose the lightest possible restrictions as said
to comply with Article 5. The idea that restriction can
turn into deprivation, also through recall after breaching
directions, has led some authors – of the contributions
most strongly in the Dutch, French and Spanish per-
spective – to argue that supervisory frameworks as a
precaution should comply with the safeguards of Arti-
cle 5 as not to come into trouble in case restrictions are
deemed as deprivation of liberty in a single case. That
also seemed to be the idea of the Dutch legislator, as in
the pre-legislative justification of the recently adopted
Dutch framework an extensive human rights check was
presented, including the standards of article 5 ECHR.
Struijk and Mevis suggest that the twofold procedure of
imposition at sentencing and the execution decision at
the end of the sentence was directly related to the case
law regarding the German nachträgliche Sicherungsver-
wahrung. However, they also see a downside of this pro-
cedure in terms of the required foreseeability (in Arti-
cle 7) whether the order will be executed or not and
with what restrictions and how the individuals behav-
iour in custody may influence the decision. Nonetheless,
they consider the framework itself not to be in violation
with the ECHR. The same is true for Meier’s opinion
on the German framework; he also considers the post-
custody formulation of directions not to be a form of a
second punishment.
The fact that both Article 5 and Article 3 – the prohibi-
tion of inhumane treatment, for example, in cases of life
sentences – seem to require perspective seems to be in
line with a requirement of detention aimed at rehabilita-
tion as expressed in some constitutions as well as Article
10(3) ICCPR, even though the ECHR does not explicit-
ly formulate it as a right.
In national case law, sometimes restrictions within a
framework of supervision are considered an infringe-
ment on certain rights and liberties under the ECHR,
not justified as provided by law, having a legitimate aim
or necessary in a democratic society. In determining
this, the interests of the offender have to be balanced
against the rights and freedoms of potential victims
(Colon v. the Netherlands 2012). In the Convention on
the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation
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and Sexual Abuse (2007/2010), states have the obliga-
tion to provide preventive measures. This balance of
interests is also provided for in German constitutional
law.
In German case law, a direction to take up residence at a
specific place prescribed by the competent division of
the regional court was not covered by national law and
was a violation of the released person’s freedom of
movement also under Article 2 (1), ECHR fourth proto-
col. In a pre-trial case, a direction to carry the equip-
ment for electronic monitoring was considered a restric-
tion of the offender’s freedom of action under national
law. In another case, the direction to make an effort to
find employment immediately after release, in a sense of
an obligation to accept any employment offered to him
by an agency, was considered a violation of the released
person’s occupational freedom under national law and
Article 15 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Euro-
pean Union. In a final case, it was ruled that the direc-
tion not to publish right-wing ideas for a period of five
years after release was a disproportionate interference
with the offender’s freedom of expression under nation-
al law and Article 10 (1) ECHR.
In national case law, the human rights perspective plays
a role in relation to possible restrictions in a single case.
However, as was described in paragraph 2.2 in relation
to that or on top of that principles like certainty and
proportionality may play an independent but similar
role. This is to be understood through the fact that the
ECHR itself provides merely a low threshold of mini-
mum rights, while national courts can also be expected
to develop equal, if not stronger, protections.
Of course, under the ECHR, infringements on certain
rights and liberties may be justified if they are propor-
tionate to a legitimate aim and pressing social need. In
addition, all sorts of soft-law rules and recommenda-
tions have in common that they call for proportionality,
defining this principle as proportionate to the serious-
ness of the committed offence, not the alleged offenders’
risk and danger. For example the Council’s Recommen-
dation on Community Sanctions and Measures
(2000/22, updated a 1992 version) merely states that a
community sanction or measure ordinarily shall not be
of indeterminate duration. But Struijk and Mevis con-
sider a determined initial duration with possible prolon-
gation as determinate enough. Other relevant recom-
mendations are those on Probation Rules (2010/1) and
conditional release (2003/22). With regard to electronic
monitoring, a separate recommendation was recently
adopted by the Council of Europe (2014/4),
to define a set of basic principles related to ethical
issues and professional standards enabling national
authorities to provide just, proportionate and effec-
tive use of different forms of electronic monitoring in
the framework of the criminal justice process in full
respect of the rights of the persons concerned.
Evaluation research showed that in terms of compliance
generally, the rules are rather vague and lack of specific-
ity resulting in all jurisdictions broadly adhering to the
recommendation. Nevertheless, more detailed examina-
tion suggests that compliance is sometimes more techni-
cal than real and that more needs to be done in order for
jurisdictions to comply more fully.44
3 Conclusion
The aim of this study was to find the legal constraints
governing the supervision of sex offenders in the com-
munity because this group was presumably the group on
which social control has its firmest grip. In all five stud-
ied jurisdictions in the past decades, changed attitudes
towards sex offenders have expanded the legal possibili-
ties of post-sentence supervision in a variety of new or
adapted existing legal frameworks. Indeed, the provi-
sions suggest that sex offenders are the group with the
least protection in a sense that principles can be breach-
ed sooner. Even though the authors report a lack of
empirical data, at least it can be concluded that this
expansion (initially) leads to a more frequent use of
supervision frameworks in practice, while in jurisdic-
tions with several options to ensure supervision not all
schemes are similarly popular. This general expansion
suggests that in the process existing legal borders have
been crossed or at least extended.
With regard to the legal constraints posed through sen-
tencing theory, it may be concluded that in a twin-track
system the more a safety measure, for example, for rea-
sons of legal protection, is blurred with retrospective
notions (of punishment) such as proportionality to the
committed offence and the requirement of a committed
offence (legality), the more theoretical borders seem to
be acknowledged. The perspective of England and
Wales shows that punishment can be blurred with pre-
ventive notions, or refuge can be taken to civil law, in a
way that the original safeguards of punishment seem of
lesser importance. It is suggested that if supervision is
considered as less intrusive than detention, theoretical
borders may be crossed sooner, such as a requirement of
treatment or rehabilitation especially for indeterminate
measures. However, like Stanley Cohen, some of the
authors of the contributions suggest that this assessment
of intrusiveness may deserve reconsidering.
With regard to constraints posed by the principle of
proportionality, it is first important to note that many
differences can be observed regarding the specific pro-
cedural safeguards that are in place. How serious should
the required offence be, how high the threshold of dan-
gerousness and how is the quality of the assessment of
risk safeguarded, at what stage in the proceedings and
by whom should supervision be imposed, when is inde-
terminacy justified and how frequent is periodic review
possible, what possible restrictions may be imposed and
what is the penalty on breaching them, what other pro-
cedural safeguards are in place and how differs the
44. Hucklesby et al., above n. 27.
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imposition in theory and in practice? Some difference
may be explained through the principle itself by the
rationale that more intrusive measures require more bal-
ancing safeguards. However, in that evaluation some
fairly intrusive frameworks may be lacking counterbal-
ance. This is even more true in practice than in theory,
as the assessment of dangerousness itself seems to
require counterbalance. Concerning concrete restric-
tions in case law, the principle of proportionality does
seem to pose legal constraints on what are considered
disproportionate restrictions. Especially a blanket pro-
hibition on computer use or the Internet access may be
considered disproportionate in several countries because
it restricts the defendant in the use of means necessary
for rehabilitation into modern society.
With regard to constraints posed by the principle of
necessity or least intrusive means, the fact that supervi-
sion is generally considered less intrusive than alterna-
tive options of deprivation of liberty – even under men-
tal health law – seems to justify supervision frameworks.
However, as most frameworks of supervision serve as a
safety net or last resort at the end of a long trajectory
through the criminal justice system, it is essentially the
ineffectiveness of that system that provides for the
necessity of supervision. Resorting to supervision must
not be used as a means to further erode treatment and
rehabilitative efforts in the criminal justice system,
meanwhile adding to its own necessity.
With regard to human rights constraints, many of the
former discussions are echoed. The notion by the
ECHR in the Guzzardi case that restrictions may be so
severe as to amount to deprivation of liberty has led
some authors to suggest that as a precaution also for
frameworks of supervision, the safeguards of Article 5
should be in place. Rehabilitation efforts may be consid-
ered part of the requirements of Article 5 inter alia. In
national case law sometimes directions of restriction of
liberty are considered an infringement on certain rights
or freedoms under the ECHR, including Article 2,
fourth protocol, and Article 10. The requirement that
infringements in order to be justified should be propor-
tionate to the intended aim is in keeping with soft-law
requirements and the finding that in national case law
restrictions are also tested on these principles, while the
ECHR solely provides minimum standards.
Having asked scholars to evaluate the supervision
frameworks in place in their respective countries, it is of
interest to know on which note they end their contribu-
tions. Two main concerns can be identified. First of all,
most authors – including Meier whose wordings are
most closely followed here – focus on the fact that from
a theoretical point of view indeterminate supervision
may be consistent with the principle of proportionality,
but this requires assessing the degree of dangerousness
which is in practice flawed by inevitability of systematic
errors, making the protective function of the propor-
tionality principle in theory remarkably more promising
than in practice. The necessity and the adequacy of
(indeterminate) supervision can in practice be easily
misjudged. In order to address this problem, of impor-
tance is not only evidence-based risk assessment, but
also improving the validity of these prediction methods.
Possibly also in light of the prohibition of ‘arbitrary’
impositions, Herzog-Evans argues that this should be
countered also by a possibility of counter-expertise.
The second concern is the fact that the frameworks of
supervision are prone to be in contradiction with the
requirement of rehabilitation as they seem to favour
control. According to Struijk and Mevis, this is related
to the principle of least intrusive means or necessity, in
the sense that the framework of supervision is mainly
necessary as a result of a lack of treatment and rehabili-
tation efforts in other frameworks. Without rehabilita-
tion efforts, supervision is deemed to be ineffective, and
subsequently disproportionate. Herzog-Evans, and
Martínez Garay and Correcher Mira point out that for
rehabilitation more resources are needed. Padfield con-
cludes that ‘ironically, it may be the cost of controls and
supervision in the community that effect more changes
in the future … Then it may not be a culture of “human
rights” that protects sex offenders from disproportion-
ate restriction and surveillance, but simply a financial
calculation.’
It would indeed be a bitter conclusion that it is not pre-
dominantly law that controls the social control of sex
offenders in the community. This study shows, howev-
er, that even though law does yield to the demands of
social control in facilitating all kinds of measures direc-
ted at sex offenders, it still provides some legal con-
straints on the restrictions of rights and liberties under
frameworks of supervision, mainly through safeguards
derived from human rights or the principles of propor-
tionality and necessity. However, as frontiers of supervi-
sion of sex offenders are continuously being pushed, and
any small next step can easily be considered necessary
and proportionate, those principles are rendered
increasingly less meaningful. As these principles are also
prone to various interpretations, their connection to
human rights jurisprudence – like that on art. 5 ECHR
– will remain relevant.
This study hopefully aids in initiating more debate and
research on what remains an under-debated and under-
researched issue. In fact, the debate itself is probably a
vital part of the counterweight required in keeping the
advancements of social control in check.
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